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 THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP:
UNIQUE FEATURES, FIRST RESULTS
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
WORKING PAPER NO. 10
OF THE
CEPS MIDDLE EAST & EURO-MED PROJECT
ERIC PHILIPPART*
Many things have changed since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Despite the
virtual collapse of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the Partnership has survived, has slowly
moved forward on many fronts and seems to be gathering pace on the economic side. This working
paper aims at presenting the new contours of the Partnership, as well as evaluating its scope of action,
logic of intervention, organisational setting and policy output from 1995-2003. A brief mid-term
outlook is offered by way of conclusion.
1  Presentation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the general framework for the relations between the European
Union, its 15 member states and 12 countries situated in the South and East of the Mediterranean area
(referred to as the ‘Mediterranean partners’).1 At the close of the Barcelona conference, in November
1995, these entities adopted an executive agreement made of a Declaration and a Work Programme
launching a triple partnership: a political and security partnership aiming at establishing ‘a common
area of peace and stability’; an economic and financial partnership aiming at ‘creating an area of
shared prosperity’ mainly through the establishment of a free trade area; and a social and cultural
partnership dedicated to human resources development, better understanding between cultures and
exchange between civil societies.
The Barcelona Declaration is an executive agreement comprising a set of general principles and
common objectives in 40 sectors or so. The Barcelona process is based on three main guiding
principles: equality in the partnership; complementing rather than displacing bilateral activities;
comprehensiveness, decentralisation and gradualism in the approach. It operates through no less than
three organisational levels:  newly created  multilateral structures,  updated  bilateral structures and
unilateral (intra-EU) mechanisms established to channel the funds made available to support the
process (see Figure 1 – all figures and tables are grouped at the end of this report).
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The implementation of the Work Programme is  given impetus  and monitored by the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for
the Barcelona process (the Euro-Med Committee). Both are chaired by the EU presidency (i.e. the
member state holding the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers). The Committee, set up at
senior official level, consists of the EU troika2 and a representative from each of the Mediterranean
partners (sometimes referred to as ‘Misters Barcelona’). At the request of the Med partners, member
states not represented in the troika have all been invited, from 1997 onwards, as observers. Meeting six
times a year, the Euro-Med Committee mainly discusses and reviews the agenda and the work
programme of the Partnership. Ad hoc sectoral meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts
provide specific impulse and follow-up for the various activities listed in the work programme (see
Table 1, third column  on o rganisational settings). With the agreement of the participants, other
countries or organisations may be involved in actions contained in the work programme. Mauritania,
Libya, as well as the Arab League and the Union du  Maghreb Arabe have been invited  to attend a
number of Euro-Mediterranean ministerials as special guests. The US government initially expressed
its interest in attending those meetings but was never invited. No ‘Barcelona secretariat’ as such was
established. Preparation and follow-up work for the meetings are largely in the hands of the European
Commission. At country level (member state or Mediterranean Partner), the ‘Mr Barcelona’ is
generally backed by a ‘Barcelona team’ whose size fluctuates over time.
Periodic Meetings of Senior Officials on Political and Security Questions are held to deal with the first
basket of the EMP. This denomination essentially underlines a deliberate non-institutionalisation of
the dialogue as a result of the (lack of) progress in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact,
these Senior Officials and the representatives on the Euro-Med Committee are often one and the same.
The political and security meetings are held on the day following the Euro-Med Committee sessions.
The main work of the Senior Officials has been to develop confidence-building measures and draft the
Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability institutionalising the political dialogue among
partners, as well as establishing crisis prevention and crisis management procedures. An agreement
was reached on the contents of the Charter in 2000. However, considering the worsening of the MEPP,
it was decided at the fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marseille
(November 2000) to defer its adoption sine die. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (‘Mr CFSP’) and the secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the EU are now playing
a significant role in those matters. The European Commission is associated but generally keeps a low
profile during those meetings.
Euro-Mediterranean institutional bridges have also flourished among Parliaments, economic actors
and civil societies.3 If such  fora and networks are encouraged or welcomed by the Barcelona
declaration, they have been given no formal role or specific rights. They may of course make
proposals, mobilise public opinions, use indirect strategies and organise their own monitoring of the
EMP’s development. But, institutionally speaking, the Euro-Mediterranean exercise remains firmly in
executive hands.
Next to this multilateral framework, the EU has kept a separate structure for its bilateral relations with
each of the Med partners. Association and Cooperation Agreements signed by the Community with
individual Mediterranean states have progressively been upgraded to Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreements (EMAA) for all those not eligible for EU membership – that is, all apart from Malta,
Cyprus and Turkey (see Table 2). In accordance with TEC Art. 310, bilateral institutions follow the
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same pattern (Ministerial Council and Senior Officials Committee) and work on the basis of strict
equality.4
Finally, a new organisational system has been set for the management of the EMP financial package.
In this system, decision-making rests entirely in the hands of EU institutions. The Commission is in
charge of the general programming (DG Relex) and project cycle management (DG Aidco). For these
purposes, it is required to draft and adopt country and regional strategy papers (CSP and RSP) defining
long-term objectives and priority areas (2000-06), national and regional indicative programmes (NIP
and RIP) based on the strategy papers and covering three-year periods, as well as annual financing
plans including a list of projects to be financed. Financing decisions are also taken by the Commission.
In addition, the Commission has to ensure coherence of EU policies and  complementarity with the
assistance programmes of the member states, as well as to promote co-financing where appropriate.
The Commission is given the further task of promoting coordination and cooperation with
international financial institutions, the United Nations cooperation programmes and other donors. Part
of the ambitious reform of EU development policy adopted in 2000, the Commission has now
completed a very substantial programme of  deconcentration and decentralisation, staff and
competencies having been transferred from headquarters to its field offices, the delegations.
The Council, together with the European Parliament, sets the general political orientation, the financial
perspective and the annual budget for external relations. The Council exerts a relatively close
monitoring of the Commission’s work through a management committee.5 This so-called  Med
Committee is chaired by the Commission’s representative and composed of representatives of the
member states, with a representative of the European Investment Bank (EIB) taking part in the
proceedings. For specific actions and financing measures, such as environmental projects to be
financed by subsidised loans or projects concerning risk-capital operations, the EIB plays a key role,
drawing up the initial project. Here, procedures are similar except the Med Committee is replaced by
the Article 14 Committee. Following the launch of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and
Partnership (FEMIP) in October 2002, the EIB has opened one regional office in Morocco for the
Maghreb and one in Egypt for the Mashreq.
With  the EMP, considerable changes have also been brought about in the number of funding
programmes, the overall size of the budget and the allocation system. There was a deliberate attempt
to decrease the number of budget lines and channel as much  funding  as possible  through one
programme, that is, MEDA. The phasing out of the pre-1995 bilateral financial protocols has been
accelerated. Basically no new budgetary lines were created.6 Grants budgeted for the region under
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MEDA went from ECU 3,424.5 million for 1995-99 to €5,350 million for 2000-06.7 The EIB offers
loans for up to €1 billion per year. In theory, the aim is to support the efforts of the Mediterranean
Partners ‘to reform their economic and social structures, improve conditions for the underprivileged
and mitigate any social or environmental consequences that may result from development’ (Art.  1,
Council regulation No. 2698/2000). In practice, MEDA funds have also been used to finance measures
relating to the political and cultural baskets of the EMP.8 Some 90% of the MEDA funds are reserved
for bilateral projects, Cyprus, Malta, Israel and Turkey being ineligible because of their higher level of
development and/or because they were already benefiting from other EC budgetary lines in accordance
with the special nature of their relationship with the Union.  The remaining 10% is budgeted for
regional activities, these being open to all Med partners.  The MEDA regulation has established
political and economic conditionality – a novelty in EU relations with the countries in the region.
Funding can be suspended in the case of a violation of democratic principles and of the rule of law, as
well as of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96 of
23 July 1996 on MEDA). Besides, funds are allocated among other things on the basis of ‘progress
towards structural reform’.
2  Evaluation of the EMP scheme
The EMP scheme – its scope of action, ambition, logic of intervention, organisational settings and
policy output – has been at times heavily critici sed. Those criticisms and arguments are reviewed
below.
2.1  The scope of action
The scope of action of the EMP has been criticised for being either too narrow or too wide. For some,
the EMP scope is too wide. It is certainly true that the items listed for debate or action are very
numerous. It is also true that the length of that list is partially the result of package dealing, in which
issues are added in order to have everybody on board. It cannot be denied either that, in several cases,
the EMP is not the only or even the best level for dealing with the problem. This being said, it is
equally difficult to demonstrate that any of the items listed is irrelevant for the EU and/or the Med
partners. Narrowing down the EMP scope would then necessarily mean alienating one of the parties.
The main answer to the question of the large number of items listed is therefore not to scratch any of
them but to prioritise the allocation of human and financial resources.9
Another argument asserts that the inclusion of some issues impedes the implementation of other parts
of the Work programme and should therefore be removed from the EMP agenda. Policy-makers and
analysts all agree that ‘difficulties in the Middle East peace process have slowed and limited the extent
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to which full regional cooperation could develop’. One option is to propose that the security basket of
the Barcelona process should be ‘quietly’ abandoned in order to focus on the two other baskets.
Besides ‘refocusing Barcelona’, Joel Peters also envisages the ‘downsizing’ option. This alternative
course of action would mean abandoning the ambition of constructing a new sense of regionalism in
the Mediterranean and the idea of a free trade zone.10 The answer to those propositions is fairly
simple. It is true that the main documents of the EMP present the three baskets as closely interrelated
and insist that progress on all fronts is needed. In practice, it appears that decoupling is not only
possible but is actually happening. Because region-building is mainly pursued through bilateral means,
the willing and the able can move forward. Arab countries do not have to enter into arrangements with
Israel and vice versa. Sub-regional progress is possible. Abandoning the security basket would
therefore bring no substantial gains. It would only result in the loss of a regular opportunity to engage
all parties on these topics and facilitate the agreement on peaceful solutions. As long as contacts and
dialogue – however difficult – seem preferable to ostracism, it would therefore be a mistake.
A last argument in favour of the narrowing down option derives from the claim that the EMP puts the
EU in a situation where it has to take sides. As a result the EU alienates Israel and disqualifies itself as
a possible mediator in the Israeli-Arab conflict. According to European officials directly involved in
those questions for a long time, the EMP, far from pushing the E U in one camp, has led  several
member states  to rebalance their position and dilute their pro-Arab stance. In order to keep the
Barcelona process going, the Union is now obliged at the end of each ministerial meeting to come up
with conclusions acceptable to all parties in the region. Abandoning the EMP could lead to further
European polarisation on the Middle East issue. So formal refocusing or ‘quiet’ downsising do not
seem necessary or useful.
Pointing at the conspicuous absence of fundamental issues, many analysts see the EMP as being too
narrow. The first omission is of course the Middle East Peace Process. The Barcelona process does not
directly deal with it. The two processes are presented as ‘complementary but separate’. However,
nobody claims that reversing that decision would benefit the EMP. The other main omissions are the
reform of the financial, monetary and trading systems, on the one hand, and the management of extra-
Mediterranean challenges on the other.
The very nature of the financial, monetary and trading systems at regional and global level is not up
for discussion. The Med partners are said to be particularly vulnerable to speculative attacks and
capital market volatility. The ‘transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems’, called for
in the UN Millennium Declaration, could have been included as a first step.11 Dialogue on monetary
and financial policies pursued on both sides appears as another missing piece.12 This has been
officially acknowledged on the EU side as never before, with the speech delivered on 23 January 2003
by the Commission President on the Mediterranean. Besides this fundamental omission, one could list
very specific issues such as the restitution of stolen or illegally exported artefacts, or the repatriation of
embezzled public funds.
The management of extra-Mediterranean challenges is not among the explicit objectives of the
Partnership. Compared to other EU partnerships (with the US, Japan or Russia), the EMP is basically
inward-looking. Of course it could be argued that the foreign policy reach of the Med partners is
relatively limited. One could nevertheless imagine a structured dialogue, inter alia, about sub-Saharan
Africa, the Gulf or the Muslim world. On the side of the Med partners, there would certainly be an
interest in trying to use the EU in order to advance their cause in Washington, the IMF or the World
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Bank. If such issues have not been explicitly put on the EMP’s agenda, they have not been explicitly
excluded either. The EU, its member states and the Med partners have accepted the principle of an
open political dialogue. It is probably better to keep it that way. This flexible approach indeed lowers
the risk of derailing or duplicating the work done properly in other international forums. It also lowers
the risk of jeopardising the take-off of the entire EMP by including highly contentious issues.
Other domains are on the EMP agenda, but the objective pursued is seen as grossly inadequate. For
instance, the Barcelona Declaration mentions the question of the debt of the Med partners, but the only
aim is to ‘continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora’. Some argue that
the EMP could provide the framework for alternative management approaches of this debt. The
foreign debt of a number of Med partners is for a large part in the hands of EU member states. The
decision to cancel bilateral debts or transform them into productive investments could be helped by
Euro-Mediterranean measures. Another much critici sed case is trade in agricultural products, for
which no firm commitment to liberalisation has been offered (circuitous wording and absence of
timetable). The movement of persons is one of the major items of the Partnership, but there is no
question of aiming for its progressive liberalisation in parallel with the free movement of goods. So it
could be said that the level of ambition and the deference shown to other organisations in the name of
subsidiarity often varies according to the interest of the EU and of (some of) its member states. There
is little room in the EMP agenda for challenging the rules of the game.
All in all, the EMP has considerably widened the scope of the relations with the Med countries (see
Table 1, first column) and upgraded the level of mutual commitments between the parties. Fairly
encompassing, the current agenda comprises consensual issues on which agreement should be
relatively easy to secure and divisive issues which require the development of better early warning,
conflict prevention and crisis management systems. Potentially explosive issues have all been
excluded. The agenda does not need to be narrowed down or further widened, at least formally. The
solution lies in prioritising the allocation of human and financial resources. As for the level of
commitments, the upgrade is significant, even if, in many cases, the targets set by the work
programme have more to do with exchange of information, dialogue and enhanced coordination than
with cooperation or joint action. The variation in the level of commitment is clearly correlated with
EU interests. That bias undermines the idea of partnership and is bound to generate suspicion and
resentment on the part of many Med countries. This should be reviewed, but such a revision seems
unlikely. The EMP is not a partnership among equals. It reflects the asymmetry of dependence and
power distribution among parties.13 The Med partners know that they have little room for manoeuvre
at that level. The scope of action of the EMP will be reviewed only if the imbalance in the actual
package dramatically destabilises the Med partners.
2.2  The logic of intervention
The EU has proposed – and to some extent imposed – an intervention logic which, as never before,
puts great emphasis on economic liberalisation and opening up to international trade.  For the
Commission, ‘trade is the most efficient means to generate resources necessary for self-sustained
development. Burgeoning economic growth in emerging areas … has stemmed more from the rise in
exports and private flows of investment than from development aid’.14 If non-reciprocal trade
preferences still exist, they have decreased in importance and are to be progressively phased out. One
important advantage of the trade-driven approach is that adjusting the pace of the experiment
(safeguard clauses), putting it on total haul or reversing to the ex ante situation (reinstating tariffs …)
is relatively easy. The fact that this paradigm shift is perhaps less the result of a dogmatic conversion
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than of a willingness to test the untested should further contribute to the cautious implementation of
the liberal approach.
If strongly inspired by liberal views, the EMP is not following a neo-liberal logic as indicated by:
•  the choice of a multi-dimensional approach;
•  the (re)affirmation of the principle of ‘special and differential treatment’ based on objective
differences;
•  the inclusion of anchoring devices; and
•  the priority given to poverty reduction  (see  Table  1, second column on the nature of the
relationship and operating mode – economic and financial partnership).
Rejecting the unidimensional approach of neo-liberal thinking, the EMP considers security, socio-
economic and cultural problems as multi-faceted and interlinked. The EMP is characterised by a multi-
dimensional logic banking on several positive spillovers between these different domains. This option
is intellectually more demanding but also more convincing. However, there are several weaknesses in
the causal sequence underpinning the current holistic logic: it overestimates the automatic nature of
the positive spillovers and probably underestimates the risk in terms of destabilisation.15 The choice of
a multi-dimensional logic presents one major advantage and one major difficulty. It provides valuable
flexibility (by allowing participants to give more importance to trade, development or foreign policy
depending on the circumstances). The difficulty lies with the obligation to have a proper overview of
several logics of intervention unfolding simultaneously.
The (re)affirmation of the principle of ‘special and differential treatment’ based on objective
differences does not fit either with the quasi-naturalist conception of the laissez-faire advocated by
neo-liberals. Having embraced the idea of a ‘fair and equitable multilateral trading system’, the EMP
recognises that, without ‘special and differential treatment’, the weakest parties would not have
‘adequate means neither to penetrate Northern markets, nor to protect their own national space and
economies’.16 There was however no systematic effort to give an operational definition to what is ‘fair
and equitable. The range of differential treatments has not been thoroughly defined either. In line with
WTO orientations, preferential market access will cease to be an option in the near future. So, what
options are left? Do they include transition periods and permanent exemptions, direct and indirect
support on a temporary or permanent basis, preventive and corrective measures? This remains unclear.
The fact that differentiation has not been repudiated altogether is of course very positive from the
perspective of securing smooth change. Uncertainty over its definition is assuredly less than positive.
Decision-makers, particularly in the Med partners, would more willingly embrace the new paradigm if
it was based on a clear set of rules.
The inclusion of anchoring devices is equally  non-neo-liberal. The liberal approach poses a serious
problem of time inconsistency: the costs are immediate and certain; the benefits are distant in time and
uncertain. Where a neo-liberal approach would simply count on the market forces for precipitating
reform, the EMP is offering various arrangements that should function as anchors for policy change.
That anchoring logic relies on a contractual method (conclusion of a bilateral treaty committing the
country to specified reforms) and a financial method (compensating the country for the
implementation costs). Effective anchoring supposes that the ‘anchoring contract is as complete as
possible’ – i.e. ‘it leaves minimum scope for discretion to the parties’.17 There should be in addition a
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clear link between the level of EU funding and trade concessions, on one side, and the extent of reform
undergone by the recipient country, on the other side. The benefits expected from the EMP must be
proportionate to the efforts and risks involved. The EMAA and MEDA have an anchoring capacity but
the latter is limited. The new generation of Association Agreements imposes detailed obligations, in
particular, on goods trade, but leaves a lot of discretion on many other key points. Exit strategy is
costly; but not exorbitant. As for the level of funding available, it is relatively low per capita or as a
percentage of the recipient GDP – see statistical tables (Nos. 4a-7) at the end of this report. The
financial presentation of the EU leads one to think that funding is on the increase. On closer look,
however, one might reach the opposite conclusion. When comparing the financial allocation for
MEDA I (1995-99) and MEDA II (2000-06), the annual allocation seems to have increased: €764
million per year for MEDA II against ECU 685 million for MEDA I. However if one takes into
account that 1995 was a marginal year for MEDA,18 the annual allocation for 1996-99 amounts to
€812.8 million. MEDA II would then represent a downturn financially speaking. In any case, once the
reforms start biting (that is, mainly after the entry into force of the EMAA – sometime between 2010
and 2015), this level of funding will most probably prove to be grossly inadequate. By then, it will not
be possible for the Med partners to shield their market from EU competition and collect large revenue
from high tariffs on imports. These flaws in the anchoring logic need to be quickly addressed, possibly
in collaboration with the other major OECD donors.
The priority given to poverty reduction is yet another indication that the EMP is not following a neo-
liberal logic. The EU explicitly ‘recognises that trade liberalisation in itself is not sufficient to combat
poverty in developing countries’.19 The liberalisation of developing economies and their opening to
international trade are seen as desirable only insofar as they lead to sustainable development; their
pace and modalities must be defined according to that principle. Besides, assistance over
infrastructures and social services are very much present in the EMP logic of intervention. The current
level of funding for this classical developmentalist and welfare agenda is not derisory, but limited. Of
course the EU is not supposed to reach that objective single-handedly. Still, European ODA
allocations, which remain way below the UN target endorsed by all  member states, are blatantly
inconsistent with the goal of poverty reduction.
The EMP policy mix consisting of economic and political liberalism combined  with  a
developmentalist agenda centred on poverty reduction is very much in line with the Bretton Woods
(the Washington consensus) and UN evolution (the Monterrey consensus20). That ‘normalisation’ of
the EU approach to the region opens new synergy perspectives. The emergence of a dominant
paradigm undeniably means less energy spent on theological debate and the possibility of defining a
division of labour among donors based on their comparative advantages.
As of today, the EU is often better placed than its member states when a policy requires:
•  global reach;
•  sustained action (for various institutional and political reasons, policy content tend to be more
stable at EU level than at a national level);
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 ‘General affairs and external relations’, 2464
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adopted on Trade and Development, pt. 4.
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 UN, Report of the international conference in financing for development, New York, 2002 (18-22 March).
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•  smooth transition from emergency aid to rehabilitation and development;
•  massive grants (in absolute and relative terms, the size of the EC budget for development is quite
large);
•  relative neutrality (because the EU is made of many different entities and it does not have as such
a colonial or imperial past, it may be symbolically or politically more acceptable);
•  pluri-national experience and multi-sectoral expertise;
•  experience in regional integration (how to establish a free trade area, a custom union and a single
market, how to harmonise and coordinate the policies of a large number of actors  and how to
organise peace-building); and
•  strong economic and trade leverages.
•  In addition, the intervention of the Union would be justified each time the member states fail to act
individually, provided that that action is in line with EU objectives. That ‘added-value’ approach
has yet to be fully operationalised or respected.
2.3  Organisational settings
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the only political institution in the region ‘where competence,
legitimacy and resources are present’.22 None of the pre- and post-Barcelona schemes has its scope,
scale and depth. Most attempts to bring together countries from different sides of the Mediterranean
were either still-born or quickly abandoned, such as the Council of the Mediterranean or the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Forum  set up in
1994 has survived as a place where EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries can deliberate informally
over their problems and discuss initiatives that could be presented for EMP endorsement.23 The ‘5+5’
Western Mediterranean Forum, launched in 1990, frozen in 1992 and relaunched in 2001, has no other
ambition than that of developing dialogue and consultation.24 None has any infrastructure or
operational ambition. Launched in December 1994, the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and its
Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) are mainly aimed at dispelling
misunderstandings about NATO’s intentions in the region and at creating bonding opportunities.
Operating ‘on a selective pan-regional basis’,25 its budget is very small.
The EMP is by now a well-established element in the European, North African and Middle East
landscape, with fairly stable features. Confronted with the dramatic deterioration of the Israeli-
                                                
22
 Hans Gunter Brauch (2001), ‘The Mediterranean Space and Boundaries’, in Antonio Marquina and Hans
Günter  Brauch ( eds),  The Mediterranean space and its borders.  Geography, politics, economics and
environment, Collection Strademed No. 14, Madrid, UNISCI, Mos-bach, AFES-PRESS.
23
 Its only collective act was perhaps the adoption of a code of conduct on terrorism at the 9th session of the
Mediterranean forum foreign ministers (Delos, 20 and 21 May 2002). The oral conclusions of the presidency
adding that the forum was aiming at the code’s inclusion in the new Action Plan adopted at the Euro-Med
Ministerial Conference  in  April 2002 in  Valencia ( http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/amii/
mediterranean_cooperation.html).
24
 The ‘5+5’ West Mediterranean Forum was a French initiative regrouping five Southern European countries –
France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain – and the five Arab Maghreb Union countries – Algeria, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. After almost 10 years of inactivity,  it was reactivated by Portugal. See
Stephen C. Calleya and Mark A. Heller (2003), The Restructuring of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership after
EU Enlargement: The Logic of  Subregionalism,  EuroMeSCO Working Group Report (forthcoming); Selim
Yenel (2002), ‘Creating a more viable Mediterranean: regional efforts, difficulties and future prospects’, paper
for the 13
th Euro-Mediterranean information & training seminar for diplomats, Mediterranean Academy of
Diplomatic of Studies, University of Malta, Msida, 15-18 November 2002.
25 
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Palestinian relations, the long stalemate in key bilateral negotiations (notably with Egypt) and the
labourious take-off of MEDA,26 the scheme has indeed demonstrated its resilience. Official protests
against the participation of Israel were formulated, but only resulted in the sporadic boycott of the
Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs by two idiosyncratic players (Syria
and Lebanon). It is however very probable that the EMP in its current geographical extension could
not survive any major escalation of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the meantime, all
parties have restated on several occasions their commitment to the Barcelona process. The institutional
features of the EMP have been fairly stable. The only major changes concerned the management of the
EMP financial package, the EU having undertaken a major reform of its structures and procedures.
The resilience and relative stability of the EMP are widely acknowledged, but its institutional
performance at other levels is generally underestimated. In terms of identifying problems, defining
objectives, selecting intervention logics, programming, delivering projects and anchoring the policy
reforms, the EMP fares much better than any previous and actual schemes in the region, including
‘South-South’ ones. Except for pre-accession packages, it also compares rather favourably with EU
schemes for other parts of the world. In-depth analysis of the Partnership shows that, after a long in-
between period and despite various enduring institutional weaknesses, the  EMP’s institutional
potential is actually increasing. The last report of the Development Assistance Committee concludes in
particular by noting a marked improvement of EU structures and processes in terms of strategic
oversight, programming, budgetary procedure, evaluation and policy feedback. 27 The amendments
introduced in the MEDA regulation (Council regulation N°2698/2000) were in that respect
fundamental (see Table 3).28
Further improvement is still possible insofar as some organisational shortcomings may be redressed
without undermining the strong points in the EMP structure.29 These strong points are:
•  the reference made to a trans-regional partnership (making the scheme particularly attractive for
countries too often excluded from region-building exercises);
•  frequent meetings of coordinating organs ( providing for deeper  socialisation, steeper learning
curve and regular adjustment of the framework for action);
•  the relative centralisation in terms of decision-making (remaining in command of the allocation of
the financial package, the EU is capable of pushing through  a number of binding decisions –
compared to other regional organisations such as the Arab League, the EMP is not totally deprived
of leadership);
•  the decentralisation in terms of initiative and implementation, which goes hand-in-hand with the
formal opening to new categories of public actors – technical ministries – and to private actors;
and, last but not least,
•  the possibility to play simultaneously at regional, sub-regional and bilateral level, allowing those
willing and able to move forward to do so (cf. advantages of multi-speed – common objectives but
                                                
26
 See Eric Philippart (2001), ‘The MEDA programme: evaluation of the new design of EU assistance to the
Mediterranean’, in Attina Fulvio and Stavridis Stelios (eds) The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean
Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille, Milano, Giuffrè, pp. 121-169.
27
 OECD – DAC (2002), Development Cooperation Review – European Community, OCDE, Paris.
28
 The last report of the Development Assistance Committee concludes on a marked improvement of EU
structures and processes in terms of strategic oversight, programming, budgetary procedure, evaluation and
policy feedback. OECD – DAC (2002),  Development Cooperation Review – European Community, OCDE,
Paris.
29 
Options for a more radical upgrade in the perspective of the new and enhanced ‘politique de voisinage’ of the
EU are discussed in the conclusions of Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci (2003),  The Rubic Cube of the
Wider Middle East, CEPS Paperback, as well as in Eric  Philippart (2003), Reinventing Integration in the
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pursued at different paces – and variable geometry formulas – the willing and able are free to
integrate at sub-regional or ‘selective pan-regional’ level).
The weaknesses and shortcomings of the EMP are situated at various structural and procedural levels:
•  relative complexity, resulting in limited readability and visibility;
•  decision-making traps at multilateral and bilateral level, linked to unanimity and the non-inclusion
of the heads of state;
•  underdevelopment of non-governmental structures; and
•  asymmetries in the multilateral structure in contradiction with the partnership spirit.
Admittedly, with its multilateral, bilateral and unilateral dimensions, the EMP architecture is relatively
complex. The existence of three organisational dimensions is nevertheless a key factor for EMP
progress. Simplifying that structure in order to increase the readability and visibility of the Partnership
– one of the objectives of the  Work Programme  recently  adopted by the  ‘Euro-Mediterranean
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ (Valencia, April 2002) – would therefore be a mistake.
Improvement should be pursued through greater information and communication efforts.
As to decision-making traps, there is only a limited scope for improvement in the near future. At
multilateral and bilateral level, the scheme operates by unanimity with all the limitations inherent in
that form of decision-making (speed and coherence). The margin for manoeuvre is very small at that
level. Limited use of constructive abstention could provide a – partial – answer at multilateral level. A
second trap results from the non-inclusion of the heads of state. The direct involvement of the top
players would undeniably lower the risk of organised non-compliance. As long as the EMP remains
restricted at ministerial level, it will be relatively easy to play the clock or come back on any
agreement, using the pretext of a mandate breach. Periodic summitry should be introduced as soon as
the Israeli-Arab conflict permits.30
Another weakness comes with the underdevelopment of non-governmental structures.  Trans-
parliamentary structures often boost international cooperation just as close involvement of certain
stakeholders organised in networks – business and consumer groups in particular – usually improve
policy design and policy landing.  Efforts at Euro-Med parliamentary level have only started to
materialise in 2002. As to the development of transnational networks, it is made particularly difficult
by the underdevelopment and weak structure of the private sector in many Med countries. These
networks should be assured that they will receive medium-term financial backing. They should also be
formally involved in the preparation stage of Euro-Med policies. As soon as export-oriented business
leaders in the Med countries emerge in sufficient number, it would be particularly useful to foster a
Euro-Mediterranean Business Dialogue on the model of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue.
Finally the EMP suffers from asymmetries in the multilateral structure that contradict the partnership
spirit. Partnership is more an objective than a reality. In line with the strong dependence of the Med
partners and the unfavourable power distribution, the nature of the relationship often corresponds more
to a soft form of hegemony than to a partnership. Yet the rhetoric creates expectations, especially at
institutional level, which, if unfulfilled, will lead to frustration. Establishing a small independent Euro-
Med secretariat, as suggested by D. Schmid, could suppress the most striking institutional imbalance
of the EMP.31 Instituting co-chairmanship as soon as the Israeli-Arab conflict permits would be an
important second step in the same direction.
                                                
30
 On the advantages of summitry, see  G.R.  Berridge (1995), Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, London,
Prentice Hall, pp. 85-86.
31
 Dorothée Schmid (2002), ‘Optimiser le processus de Barcelone’,  Occasional Papers, No. 36, Institute for
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3  The Barcelona acquis – Policy output 1995-2003
The Barcelona process has not only survived but is progressively gathering momentum.  Well
established international regimes contribute to increased levels of cooperation by lowering transaction
costs (among other things, they foster contacts and facilitate the exploration of possible package
deals); reducing uncertainty and risks (they enhance mutual understanding of the international context,
increase mutual transparency and structure mutual expectations); and lengthening ‘the shadow of the
future’ (they create an incentive to abide by agreements, since, in a repeated game, credibility is a
valuable asset which is worth more than the immediate gains from defection). Despite various
shortcomings reviewed supra, the introduction of the EMP has clearly lowered transaction costs
among partners and, to a lesser extent, reduced uncertainty and lengthened the shadow of the future.
The record of the three baskets of the partnership is contrasted (see Table 1, fourth column).32 All in
all, progress is strongly correlated with areas where the EU has a significant competence, weight and
expertise. The first basket has very limited concrete achievements to show, but as often mentioned, it
has the great merit of being the only regional scheme where Arab countries and Israel are side by side.
It has also become the only place where the Israeli government tolerates the EU as a ‘partner’ in
Middle-East security and political matters. As to the third basket, many programmes were set up, some
being now completed or extended. Results are often in line with objectives, but the latter were rather
modest. It seems fair to say that on the cultural, audiovisual or educational level, what has been
achieved is rather patchy and elite-oriented. The very important decision in July 2002 to open the
Tempus programme (university cooperation) to Mediterranean Third Countries or the launch of the
Erasmus World Programme (student exchanges) has yet to bear fruits. The same is true for the first
large-scale projects in the field of migration management and border control (2002-04).33
The second basket, in terms of policy output,  has a better record. The record of socio-economic
programmes (classical development assistance) is honourable, considering the intensity of the
problems and the limited amount of funds available for each recipient country. As for policy changes
at regulatory, economic and social level, results were slow, since 2000,  important steps have been
taken, particularly true regarding the development of an enhanced framework for Euro-Med trade.
Third generation association agreements have now been signed with all Med countries but one (Syria).
The Valencia Action Plan adopted in April 2002 signalled a further move towards deeper economic
integration, with the launch of the Euromed Internal Market Programme. More concretely perhaps, the
Valencia ministerial conference also endorsed the principle of the participation of the Med partners to
the system of Pan-European cumulation of origins – a more generous and inclusive option than what
was initially envisaged. In addition, these advances towards the Euromed Free Trade Area have
directly contributed to the reactivation of South-South schemes such as the Free Trade Area agreement
initialled in Amman on 11 January 2003, by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia (the Agadir process).
These regulatory developments are undeniably important but should be kept in perspective. What has
been achieved so far has a limited reach. For instance, the breakthrough over the cumulation of origins
is significant ‘only insofar as there is sufficiently high preference margin justifying the time and
money to be spent by Mediterranean industrialists’ in order to benefit from this regime, i.e.
‘maintaining separate stocks according to their origin, separate accountancy, lawyers’ fees, etc’.34
                                                
32 
For a detailed assessment of the EMP policy output, see Eric Philippart (2003), Reinventing Integration in the
Mediterranean – The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Beyond, CEPS report, forthcoming.
33
 ‘Regional cooperation programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as
well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and
movement of people’, framework document endorsed by the 5
th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. See
also Commission européenne,  Intégrer les questions liées aux migrations dans les relations de l’Union
européenne avec les pays tiers, COM (2002) 703 final, 3 décembre 2002.
34
 Ugur and Tovias, op. cit., p. 20; see also Paul Brenton and Miriam Manchin (2003), Trade Policy Issues for
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Besides, if the policies of the Med partners are progressively adjusted to EU and international
standards, the situation on the ground is evolving much more slowly. For example, while privatising,
the state often starts acting as patron of a small and dependent class of entrepreneurs.35 More
importantly, most partners have yet to grapple fully with the three dilemmas that come with the
opening to international trade: the distributional dilemma (who will be the winners and losers at
domestic level?); the value dilemma (how much emphasis will be put on competition to the detriment,
among other things, of security and family?); and the state-orientation dilemma (how much national
sovereignty will be abandoned in the process?). In other words, the adjustment of the policy
framework (competition, trade, tax and privatisation policies) in Med partners is far from completed.
This done, they will still have a lot of work to do in terms of image (reassuring investors about
economic, political and social stability, lowering hassle costs related for instance to corruption or
inefficient administration; improving the quality of life) and structural factors (physical and human
capital resources, the purchasing power of the inhabitants or the size of the market). These things tend
to change very slowly. It is therefore not astonishing that tangible results in terms of growth, FDI and
poverty reduction have yet to come.36
4  Mid-term outlook
There are solid arguments for the continuation of the EMP. The scheme is not without qualities as
indicated above. Moreover, a lot of capital has now been invested in that scheme in order to develop, if
not a sense of common identity, at least cooperative automatisms. As long as comprehensive and
sustainable peace has not been reached at Israeli-Arab level, there is little room for alternative
organisations in the region. Last but not least, the dominance of the liberal paradigm at international
level plays strongly in favour of the current logic of intervention.
Differences in terms of capacity and willingness will remain substantial among Med partners.
Liberalisation and openness, for instance, are good things only when specific conditions are met.
Consequently different levels of integration will continue to co-exist within the general framework
provided by the EMP. In other words, sub-regional clubbing – possibly on an ad hoc basis – will
endure. Schemes exclusively based on the Maghreb or the Mashreq would indeed be sub-optimal in
many respects. That approach would complicate the lives of the willing and able (for instance by
impeding the development of the Agadir project). Moreover, in several domains, the Maghreb or the
Mashreq taken separately  would simply  not have sufficient critical mass. Finally, this separated
approach would further aggravate the power gap between the EU and its partners, with the risk of
exacerbating a ‘Latin American syndrome’ in those regions.37
The future of the EMP will be determined inter alia by three important questions. Firstly, will the
scheme have the capacity to anchor policy reforms in the Med partners once those reforms will enter
on a more active phase? As already mentioned the most costly steps are still ahead. It remains to be
seen if the EU will find the extra funding needed to smooth  such a difficult transition, with newly
admitted member states busy renegotiating the financial terms of their accession. Secondly, will it be
                                                
35
 See Emma Murphy (2002), ‘Navigating the Economic Reform in the Arab World : Social Responses, Political
Structures and Dilemmas for the European Union’, in Christian-Peter  Hanelt, Felix  Neugart & Matthias Peitz
(eds), Europe’s Emerging Foreign Policy and the Middle East Challenge, Bertelsmann Foundation, Munich, pp.
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possible to develop a new enhanced association status (politique de voisinage) which will not be to the
detriment of policy convergence with the other major donors and players? The EU intends to offer a
new formula of deeper integration to its immediate neighbours. The question is then to find a very
inclusive status, just short of membership, which would not deter other donors. The paradigmatic
convergence among donors  active in the Mediterranean  is indeed an important asset for parallel
programming and much needed co-financing. Thirdly, what place is to be given to a post-Saddam Iraq
keen to normalise its relations with the region? On the one hand, Iraqi ties with the rest of Mashreq are
so close that it would certainly be sub-optimal to exclude the country from regional integration and
keep relations with the EU on a purely bilateral basis.38 On the other hand, including Iraq in the EMP
would necessitate some Euromed rethinking.39 Keeping the Mediterranean as the main geographical
reference for the partnership would become much more difficult after the inclusion of Iraq.
There is admittedly a part of historical invention and ideological opportunism in any new and regional
conceptualisation. Seeing the Mediterranean as one space is no exception.40 This being said, the
Mediterranean reference has a positive connotation for the Europeans and several of the Med partners.
It means very little if anything for the remaining Med partners. That makes it acceptable for all. As of
today, one country, Jordan, does not have a Mediterranean shore. It could however be argued that this
is the one and only exception to the rule, that Jordan (Transjordan) was a Mediterranean country until
1967 and must be considered as a Mediterranean hinterland. None of this would be true for Iraq. The
formal inclusion of Iraq would raise the issue of double standards (what about other non-
Mediterranean countries keen to join the partnership).
And more importantly perhaps, it would pose the problem of the main reference for the partnership.
The reference to a Euro-Arab partnership is problematic because of the existence of large non-Arab
populations in the region (Berber, Jewish, etc.). One could of course propose to place EU-Israel
relations back on an exclusively bilateral basis (which does not preclude the normalisation of its
relations with the Arab world through peace treaties and/or free trade agreements, also on a bilateral
basis). Assuming that non-Arab countries withdraw from the scheme, the reference to the Arab world
would still pose problems, starting with the inclusion of the Gulf countries. Supposing that current
regimes  remain in  power, their inclusion would impose a significant lowering of the political
ambitions of the partnership in terms of human rights and good governance. Other members of the
Arab League pose different problems: they belong to the category of the least developed countries
(Mauritania, Yemen, Comoros, Djibouti). Some of those are already included in the ACP scheme. As
far as the Comoros and Djibouti are concerned, there is no geographic continuity or proximity with the
other members. Replacing the Mediterranean reference by a reference to the Muslim world would pose
even more problems. One solution for referring to a regional partnership including Iraq would be to
use the Anglo-Saxon concept of MENA (Middle-East and North Africa). The partnership would then
refer to three separate regions, emphasising implicitly their differences and separateness. This would
deprive the partnership of the single feature that unites the partners –. their Mediterranean component.
                                                
38
 On the advantages of dealing with Iraq together with the rest of the Mashreq, see Michael Emerson and
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Table 1. Scope of action, level of integration and organisational settings of the EMP (31 January 2003)
Scope of action Nature of the relation & operating mode Organisational settings Achievement
Indep. Assess.* Official wording
POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP
1.  Human rights &
fundamental freedoms
Cooperation
educational,
diplomatic, financial
No ‘intervention in internal affairs of another
partner’; statements of individual
commitments; exchange of information &
dialogue; technical & financial assistance
Standard Configuration (SC), i.e.
formal multilateral and bilateral
meetings, up to foreign affairs ministers
(see graph 2) Euro-Mediterranean
Human Rights network
Slow and limited,
‘hegemonic’ pressure
mainly through informal
and bilateral means
2.  State-civil society
relation
Cooperation
educational,
diplomatic, financial
Statements of individual commitments
regarding the development of democratic
institutions, rule of law …, treatment of –
immigrated – minorities
SC Idem
3.  Public administration
management
Cooperation
educational, financial
Technical & financial assistance to the Med
partners
SC Variable
4.  Terrorism Cooperation
operational, financial
Exchanges of information and improving
extradition procedures; reinforced cooperation
among police, judicial and other authorities,
ratification and application of international
(UN) instruments on that matter
SC + informal Ad Hoc Meeting on
Terrorism, at expert level (2 meetings
before 11 Sept 2001; 3 meetings in
2002)
Slow and very limited. New
developments planned for
2002-04 (framework
document – reg. coop.
progr.)
5.  Drug trafficking,
international crime and
corruption
Coalition
operational and
financial
Technical & financial assistance; improved
cooperation among police, judicial, customs,
administrative and other authorities
SC + periodical Euromed ‘justice and
home affairs’ meeting at expert and
senior official level (started in 2001)
Slow and limited. New
developments planned for
2002-04 (reg. coop. progr.)
6.  Civil protection Cooperation
educational,
operational and
financial
Technical & financial assistance SC + network of the civil protection
services
Fair speed and substantial;
operational mainly at sub-
regional and bilateral level
7.  Non-proliferation /
arms control / disarmament
regarding nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons
Cooperation
diplomatic,
operational
Dialogue; cooperation (mutual verification),
promotion of international and regional
regimes
SC + EuroMesCo (network of foreign
policy institutes) & Strademed
(Stratégies et development en
Méditerrannée)
Very limited if any
8.  Defence matters Cooperation
diplomatic
Dialogue SC + EuroMesCo (network of foreign
policy institutes) & Strademed
Very limited
*The operating modes are listed in decreasing order of importance.16
9.  Crisis prevention, crisis
management and peace
building in the
Mediterranean
Partnership/
hegemonic
diplomatic,
operational,
educational,
financial, normative
Good-neighbourly relations; confidence and
security-building measures; support for
(sub)regional processes; (preparation of a)
Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and
Stability proclaiming a number of shared
principles and setting procedures
SC + Ad hoc Senior Officials Meeting
on Charter for Peace and Stability
Slow, fragile and limited
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PARTNERSHIP
10.  Trade in goods and
services
Partnership
educational,
normative, laissez-
faire
Free trade area; closer links among chambers
of commerce from the EU and the Med
partners (cf. Archimedes programme &
twinnings); sub-regional (South-South)
regional and global integration based on the
principles of market economy; coordinated
position in global organisations
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
conference on trade (1
st meeting on 29
May 2001) + several working groups
(thematic + ‘relevant for regional
integration’) + Employers networks
(Unimed & UMCE) + ‘Euro-
Mediterranean forum on consumer
policy’
Slow but gathering
momentum; very
substantial, yet incomplete,
commitments
11.  Customs policy,
including rules of origin
Partnership /
hegemonic
normative,
operational,
educational
Harmonisation of rules and procedures
(alignment of Med partners) + cumulation of
origin (inclusion in the pan-European system
of cumulation of rules of origin)
SC + Trade sectoral ministerials + pan-
euro-mediterranean working group on
rules of origin (12 July 2001) replacing
the ‘Meeting of Officials on rules of
origin’ (1
st meeting March 1996)
Slow but very substantial in
terms of commitments;
limited operational record
(pilot scheme of joint
checks at sea in 2001)
12.  Competition policy Partnership /
hegemonic
normative,
educational,
operational
General definition of practices forbidden on
both sides when they affect trade between the
Union and the Med-partner (undertakings’
arrangements perverting competition; abuse of
dominant position and distorting public aid);
legislative compatibility; exchange of
information
SC + Trade sectoral ministerials +
working group
Slow and substantial;
hegemonic alignment, but
variable extent of
commitments
13.  Investment policy Partnership /
hegemonic
normative, laissez-
faire, financial,
educational
Creating ‘a climate favourable to the removal
of obstacles to investment’ in the Med
partners
SC + Trade sectoral ministerials +
working group on FDI flows (1
st
meeting 18 December 2001)
Slow and limited; variable
record at bilateral MS-Med
partner level (invest.
protection, double taxation,
…)
14.  Banking sector Hegemonic
educational,
normative, financial,
laissez-faire
Restructuring and opening of the Med
partners’ banking sector (risk capital facility)
SC + ‘Euro-Mediterranean banking
forum’ (12 December 1996); Meeting
of the Central Banks (28 Nov. 1997)
Slow and limited17
15.  Industrial policy,
including conformity
testing, certification,
accreditation and quality
standards
Hegemonic
normative,
educational, financial
Harmonisation by alignment of Med partners
on European standards and procedures
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference on Industrial Cooperation
(1
st meeting 20 May 1996 – every 2
years) + Working group on industrial
cooperation
Fair speed and substantial
16.  Regulatory policy
regarding the private sector
Hegemonic
educational,
operational,
normative
Reform of the policy of the Med partners
regarding business environment, including
SMEs
SC Variable speed; mainly
technical assistance & Euro-
Med business centres
17.  Employment policy Hegemonic
educational, financial
Reform of the policy of the Med partners SC + ‘meeting of the reinforced
economic dialogue’ (1
st meeting 19
October 2001)
Fair speed and substantial
18.  Tourism Partnership
educational,
financial, normative,
laissez-faire
Exchange of information, data collection, joint
promotion and training; implementation and
upgrading of the ‘Mediterranean Tourism
Charter’ of 1995
SC + Ministerial Conference on
Tourism (10 May 1996) + Euro-
Mediterranean Tourism Organisation
(est. in 1998, located in Rabat)
Fair speed and in line with
the objectives
19.  Energy sector,
including energy networks
Partnership /
hegemonic
operational, financial,
normative, laissez-
faire
Encouraging producer-consumer dialogue;
cooperation on the Med partners’ energy
planning, exploration, transportation,
distribution, trade; generation and
transmission of power and interconnection
and development of networks (cf. the
Mediterranean electric ring project);
efficiency; new and renewable sources;
environmental issues; development of joint
research programmes; association of
Mediterranean countries with the 1994
(European) Energy Charter Treaty
(establishing an open and competitive market
+ rules, inter alia, on freedom of transit,
compensation for losses, expropriation)
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Conference
of Energy Ministers (1
st meeting 7 June
1996) + the Euro-Mediterranean
Energy Forum (est. Oct. 1999) and its
secretariat (DG energy)
Link with extra Euro-med regimes, i.e.
(former European) Energy Charter
Treaty (ad hoc membership)
Variable speed; limited at
normative level (Energy
Charter Treaty considered
as the reference instrument);
substantial at operational
level (EIB loans …) with
emphasis on the security of
supply; strong regional
dimension
20.  Science and technology Partnership
operational,
educational, financial
Technical, financial assistance and training;
joint action ‘taking account of the principle of
mutual advantage’
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Science and
Technology Monitoring Committee (1
st
meeting: 2 May 1996)
[Rem.: The Ministerial Conference on
Science and Technology envisaged in
1997 never convened]
Slow and limited (beside
Israel & Turkey); Euromed-
Human Sciences
programme 200218
21.  Environmental policy,
including integrated
management of water,
waste, coastal zones of
erosion; fight against
desertification;
environmental hotspots
Partnership /
hegemonic
educational,
operational, financial,
normative
Joint assessment of problems; joint initiatives;
establishment of a ‘short and medium-term
priority action programme for the
environment’ (SMAP) focusing on the
Mediterranean Sea and the Med partners; (cf.
regional Euro-Mediterranean initiative in the
area of local water resources management);
joint proposals for joint planning and
management of water resources; development
of regional regimes (upgrade of the 1992
Mediterranean Charter for Water)
SC + periodical Euro-Mediterranean
Ministerial Conference on the
Environment & Water (1
st meeting
November 1996) + the SMAP
Correspondents Network (1
st meeting
16 Nov. 1998) + Euro-Mediterranean
Forum on Water
Links with the coordinating unit of the
Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP
1975) of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) + the
major donors’ structure, the
Mediterranean Environment Technical
Assistance Programme (METAP 1988
– secretariat at the World Bank)
Fair speed and substance at
educational, operational and
financial level; no joint
management or normative
development
22.  Agriculture policy,
including production
diversification, food
security & safety, promotion
of environment-friendly
agriculture and privatisation
Hegemonic
educational,
financial, operational,
normative
Exchange of experience and know-how;
technical and financial assistance, training;
‘closer relations between businesses, groups
and organisations representing trades and
professions in the partner states’
SC Fair speed; mixed results
Slow opening of EU market
gathering momentum at
bilateral level
23.  Fishery policy Partnership /
hegemonic
normative,
educational,
financial, operational
Monitoring and data collection; bringing Med
partners practices in line with the code of
conduct defined by DG fishery & FAO;
technical assistance on the supply side of the
Med partners
SC
Link with the FAO (UN) General
Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean
(1949) that includes all riparian states
Fair speed; limited
24.  Transport Partnership /
hegemonic
financial, operational
Development of a trans-Mediterranean
multimodal combined sea and air transport
system; connection of Mediterranean transport
networks to the Trans-European Network;
integration in Galileo satellite system
SC + Coordination by the Euro-
Mediterranean Transport Forum (1
st
meeting March 1999) and its working
groups (on Air Transport, Maritime
Transport and Network &
Infrastructure);
link with the European Conference of
Ministers of Transport (1953 adm. part
of the OECD) and with the GTMO
(Groupe Transports de la Méditerranée
Occidentale)
Fair speed: substantial;
strong (sub)regional
dimension19
25.  Telecommunications
and information technology
Partnership /
hegemonic
educational,
operational, financial
Opening of the Med partners’ sector thanks to
New Approaches to Telecom Policy (NAPT -
exchange of information and experience);
modernisation of the Med telecom
infrastructure; development of regional
infrastructures including links with European
networks (cf. EUMEDIS, the Euro-
Mediterranean Information Society Initiative)
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference on the Information Society
(30 May 1996) + periodical Euro-
Mediterranean Information Society
Forum (1
st meeting 17 May 1999)
Fair speed; substantial
especially at financial level
(MEDA + EIB); strong
regional dimension
26.  Statistics Hegemonic /
partnership
educational,
operational, financial
Improvement of the Med partners’ statistical
systems by aligning them on international and
European methodologies and standards
(Medstat programme & network); data
exchange
SC + Director’s Committee (directors-
General of the statistical services of the
Euro-Med partners + EFTA) replacing
the Seminar of the Directors General
for Statistics and Regional Programme
for Cooperation in statistics (1995-7) +
Reflection Group
Fair speed and substantial
27.  Macro-economic
management
Cooperation
diplomatic,
educational
Dialogue SC + periodical meeting of the
reinforced economic dialogue &
‘meeting of experts on economic
transition + Femise network (‘Forum
Euro-Méditerranéen des Instituts
Economiques’)
Fair speed and in line with
objectives
28.  Budgetary policy Hegemonic /
partnership
financial, educational
Dialogue on the Med partners’ policy; direct
budgetary assistance through ‘Structural
adjustment facilities’ of general (macro-
economic stabilisation) and sectoral nature
(banking, health, education, transport, external
trade)
SC + Euromed conference of Finance
and Economy Ministers (1st meeting
October 2002)
Direct link with the World Bank and
the IMF for SAF management
Variable speed; substantial
29.  Public debt Cooperation
diplomatic
Dialogue on the Med partners’ foreign debt in
order to achieve progress in the competent
fora
SC Very limited, if any20
PARTNERSHIP IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
30.   Culture Cooperation /
Partnership
educational,
financial, operational
Inter-cultural and inter-civilisational dialogue;
mutual recognition and understanding; contact
between civil societies; greater closeness
between peoples; cultural exchanges; funding
of cultural and artistic events, co-productions
(in particular in the audio-visual sector, see
below)
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Conference
of the Ministers of Culture (1
st meeting
22 April 1996) + Euro-Mediterranean
Foundation (2003?)
Fair speed and limited
(largely restricted to elites)
31.  Cultural heritage Cooperation
educational,
financial, operational
Inventory, networking of historical sites,
exchange of experience, technical assistance
and skill training with special emphasis on the
Mediterranean partners (EuroMed Heritage)
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Conference
of the Ministers of Culture
Fair speed and substantial
32.  Religion Cooperation /
Partnership
educational
Inter-religious dialogue; understanding among
religions; mutual tolerance and cooperation
SC Fair speed and limited
33.  Education and training
(development of human
resources & linguistic skills)
Partnership
operational,
educational, financial
Dialogue on educational policies; sharing
modern management approaches; exchange of
students and staff (Medcampus, Tempus);
special contribution of Euro-Arab Business
School in Granada and the European
Foundation (Turino) with special emphasis on
the Mediterranean partners
SC Slow but gathering
momentum; substantial
34.  Audiovisual sector Partnership
operational, financial
Close interaction between EU and Med
partners media (EuroMed audiovisual
programme); support for pre-production
(MEDEA) and co-production; promotion of
cross-distribution (Europa Cinémas &
CinemaMed project)
SC + Audiovisual Conference of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(professionals)
Fair speed; limited to
substantial; strong regional
dimension
35.  Illegal immigration Partnership
diplomatic,
operational,
normative
Legal commitment on readmission of
nationals in illegal situation; improved
cooperation among police, judicial, customs,
administrative and other authorities
SC + meeting of Justice and Home
Affairs senior officials (1
st meeting 8
March 2002), preceded by meeting at
expert level (1
st meeting in 2001)
Slow but gathering
momentum; limited
commitments (incomplete);
substantial operational and
financial efforts focused on
Morocco21
36.  Migration policy Cooperation
diplomatic,
operational, financial
Dialogue on the living conditions of migrants
legally established in the Union; dialogue on
the management of migration flows;
cooperation to reduce migratory pressures in
the Med partners (among other things through
vocational training programmes and
programmes of assistance for job creation)
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference on Migration and Social
Integration of Migrants (1
st meeting
planned for second half of 2003) + ad
hoc meeting of Senior Officials on
migration and human exchanges (1
st
meeting October 2000)
Slow but gathering
momentum; substantial
operational and financial
efforts focused on Morocco
37.  Social development,
including anti-poverty and
gender policies
Hegemonic
educational,
operational, financial,
normative
Contribution in the Med partners to improving
the living and working conditions of the
population, in particular of women and the
neediest strata of the population; promotion of
basic social rights
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Summit of
Economic and Social Councils and
Similar Institutions (since 1996)
Fair speed (gathering further
momentum); substantial at
operational and financial
levels
38.  Youth policy
(horizontal issue)
Hegemonic /
partnership
educational, financial
Facilitating the integration of young people
into socio-professional life and the
democratisation of the civil society of the
Mediterranean partners; improving mutual
respect through mobility –exchange and
voluntary service (Euro-Mediterranean Youth
Action Programme)
SC + EU Youth forum + Network of
national co-ordination structures (Med
national coordinators joining the
network of MS national agencies) +
Euro-Mediterranean platform of youth
organisations of the partners
Slow but gathering
momentum; limited
39.  Health issues, including
the demographic dimension
Hegemonic
financial, operational
Developing the Med partners’ health services,
as well as family planning, epidemiological
supervision systems and control of
communicable diseases
SC + Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference on health (3 December
1999)
+ donors consultative groups (USAID,
etc.) often co-organised by the recipient
country and the World Bank
Variable speed; substantial22
Table 2. Bilateral agreements between the EC and the Med partners (31 January 2003)
Partner Pre-1995 situation Post-1995 situation
Cyprus Association Agreement (first generation)
signed on 19 December 1972; entered into force on 1 June 1973;
Agreement and Protocol on implementation of the second stage
of the Agreement, entered into force on 1 January 1988
Customs Union
stage 2 of the phase 2 (which should have been implemented in January 1998) unofficially
frozen by the Commission
candidate member state of the EU
negotiations formally opened in March 1998, and concluded in December 2002
Malta Association Agreement (first generation)
signed on 5 December 1970; entered into force on 1 April 1971
Customs Union
candidate member state of the EU
negotiations suspended in 1996; resumed in 1998 and concluded in December 2002
Turkey Association Agreement (first generation)
signed on 12 September 1963; entered into force on 1 December
1964; Agreement and Additional Protocol signed on 23
November 1970
Customs Union
entered into force on the 31 December 1995
recognition of its status as a candidate member state of the EU in December 1999; decision
on the date for the opening of negotiation to be taken in 2004 if the Copenhagen criteria are
met at that time
Israel Cooperation Agreement
signed on 11 May 1975 (Additional Protocol signed on 8
February 1977); entered into force on 1 November 1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement*
signed on 20 November 1995, entered into force on 1 June 2000
(Interim Agreement on the implementation of trade and trade-related matters entered into
force on 1 January 1996; 1996 and 1999 agreements on scientific and technical cooperation;
1996 agreement on public procurement )
Palestinian
Authority
- Interim Agreement
signed on 24 February 1997
EC + Palestinian authority ratification only
entered into force on 1 July 1997
Tunisia Cooperation Agreement
signed on 25 April 1976; and entered into force on 1 November
1978 (succeeding the Agreement of March 1969)
Euro-Med Association Agreement
signed on 17 July 1995
entered into force on 1 March 1998
Morocco Cooperation Agreement
signed on 27 April 1976; entered into force on 1 November 1978
(succeeding the Agreement of March 1969)
Euro-Med Association Agreement
signed on 26 February 1996
entered into force on 1
st March 2000
Jordan Cooperation Agreement
signed 18 January 1977; entered into force on 1 November 1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement
initialled on 16 April 1997, signed on 24 November 1997, entered into force on 1
st May 2002
Egypt Cooperation Agreement
signed on 18 January 1977; entered into force on 1 November
1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement
formal opening of negotiations in May 1994
initialled on 11 June 1999, signed on 25 June 200123
Algeria Cooperation Agreement
signed on 26 April 1976; entered into force on 1 November 1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement
exploratory talks finished in 1995; formal opening of negotiations February 1997, initialled
on 19 December 2001, signed on 22 April 2002
Lebanon Cooperation Agreement
signed on 3 May 1977; entered into force on 1 November 1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement
negotiations concluded in December 2001, initialled on 10 January 2002, signed on 17 June
2002; approved by the EP on 16 Janurary 2003
Interim Agreement signed on 17 June 2002 on the immediate effect of the economic and
trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement
Syria Cooperation Agreement
signed on 18 January 1977; entered into force on 1 November
1978
Euro-Med Association Agreement
formal opening of negotiations May 1998
Note: Ranked according to the level of integration between the signatories.24
Table 3. Comparison of the regulation for MEDA I and MEDA II
Art. Topic MEDA regulation 1996 Commission’s proposal 1999 MEDA regulation 2000
1(1) Main intermediate objectives of
the programme
To support the efforts that Mediterranean partners
will undertake to reform their economic and social
structures and mitigate any social or environmental
consequences which may result from development.
No proposed amendment To support the efforts […] to reform their economic
and social structures, improve conditions for the
underpriviledged and mitigate any social or
environmental consequences which may result from
development
1(3) Duration of the programme 1995 to 1999 No reference 2000 to 2006
1(3) Financial reference amount ECU 3,424.5 million No reference €530 billion
2(2) Overall objectives … achieving long-term stability and prosperity, in
particular in the fields of economic transition,
sustainable economic and social development and
regional and cross-border cooperation
No proposed amendment Reference to ‘sustainable development’ as the first
objective; to ‘subregional’ rather than ‘cross-
border’ cooperation; and to the capacity to
‘integrate into the world economy’
4(1) Responsibility for coherence,
complementarity and
coordination (the ‘3 Cs’)
‘The Commission shall, in agreement with the
member states […] ensure the effective
coordination’ of Community and member states’
efforts, as well as promote coordination with
international institutions
No proposed amendment ‘The Commission shall, in liaison with the member
states …’.
4(2) Possibility of co-financing Possible co-financing with the Mediterranean
partners, public or private bodies of the member
states and the EIB, or multilateral bodies or third
countries
No proposed amendment Commission invited, ‘where appropriate’, to
promote such co-financing on the basis of a
reciprocal and early exchange of information with
the member states
5(2) National and regional strategy
papers (SP) defining long-term
objectives and priority areas
No reference No reference Introduced by the new §2
5(3) Indicative programmes (IP) –
inclusion of an evaluation of
progress made in the reforms
Indirect reference (IP may be amended on the basis
of progress achieved)
Obligatory evaluation Indicative programmes must be based on the SP;
‘shall include an evaluation of progress’
5(4) Annual financing plans (FP)
presenting a list of projects to be
financed
No reference Introduction of FP proposed FP must be established on the basis of the IP in
liaison with the European Investment Bank (EIB)
5(5) Consistency and
complementarity of measures
concerning risk capital and
interest rate subsidies with IP
and FP
No reference Obligatory The Commission, in liaison with the EIB, shall
ensure complementarity and coherence25
5(6) Basis for financing decisions
(FD)
FD chiefly based on the IP FD based on the IP or FP FD decision based on IP if the projects are not part of
a FP
6(1) Interest rate subsidy for loans
in the field of environment
3% 1 to 3% Interest rate set according to the financial
characteristics of the operation; subsidy rate = half
the interest rate, as long it does exceed 3%
6(3) Provisions for supervision
and financial control over the
use of the grants & loans
Supervision and control by the Commission and the
Court of Auditors, where appropriate on the spot
Provisions must give the
Commission the right to
conduct on-the-spot checks and
inspections
Provisions must give the Commission the right to
conduct on-the-spot checks and inspections
6(4) Risk capital sectoral target
and forms
For the ‘production sector’, under the form of
subordinated or conditional loans, as well as
temporary minority holdings
No proposed amendment ‘primarily to strengthen the private sector’ and in
particular the financial sector. Other forms of risk
capital may be envisaged.
7(1) Definition of eligible
expenditures
Imports of goods and services and local expenditure
needed for the projects
Idem + direct budgetary
support backing economic
reform programme (facilities
for structural adjustment)
Idem + direct budgetary support backing economic
reform programme (facilities for structural
adjustment)
7(2) Definition of eligible
administrative costs
Costs of preparation, initiation, following up,
monitoring and implementing support measures
Idem + costs of auditing and
controlling projects; explicit
reference to technical and
administrative assistance
(Meda teams)
Idem + costs of auditing and controlling projects;
explicit reference to technical and administrative
assistance (Meda teams)
8(4) (7) Procedures regarding
invitation to tender and
contract
Obligation for the Commission to provide
information on the MEDA programmes and to
publish the results of the invitations to tender in the
Official Journal of the EC
No proposed amendment Idem + obligation to use internet and definition of
minimal information requirements on the results of
the invitations to tender
9(1) Financial programme
planning of the Commission
Forwarded for information No proposed amendment Information forwarded must include the
Commission’s ‘underlying reasoning in the context
of the strategy papers’
9(2) Adoption of SP, IP and FP Adoption and amendment of IP according to Art. 11
procedure (see below)
Adoption and amendment of IP
and FP according to Art. 11
procedure
Adoption and amendment of SP, IP and FP according
to Art. 11 procedure
9(3) (5) Procedure for the adoption of
financing decisions
Adoption according to Art. 11 procedure; below
ECU 2 million, the Commission decides and informs
the Med-Committee
The Commission decides for
all FD covered by FPs; for FD
not covered by FPs, application
of Art. 11 procedure
Adoption according to Art. 11 procedure; below
Euro 2 million, provided that the FD forms part of an
overall allocation, the Commission decides and
informs the Med-Committee26
9(4) Procedure for the amendment
of FD adopted under Art. 11
procedure
Right of the Commission to amend FD if the
amendment is not substantial or if the additional
commitment does not exceed 20% of the original
commitment
Provision suppressed Provision upheld
9(6) Procedure for the adoption of
exchange programmes under
decentralised cooperation
Exchange programmes adopted by Art. 11 procedure Provision suppressed Provision suppressed
11(1)
(2) (3)
Comitology (name and type
of the Committee composed
of representatives of the
member states and set to
assist the Commission)
Med Committee = regulatory committee
Type IIIa in 1987 comitology nomenclature,
designed for regulatory activities (The Commission
submits a draft of the measure to the Committee for
approval. In the case of a negative opinion or no
opinion, the Commission submits a proposal to the
Council. The Council decides by QMV .)
Meda Committee
Management procedure of the
1999 comitology nomenclature
Med Committee = management committee
(The Commission submits a draft of the measure to
the Committee for opinion. The Commission adopts
the measure which applies immediately. If the
measure is not in accordance with the opinion of the
Committee, it is communicated to the Council. The
Council has three months to take a different decision,
acting by qualified majority.)
12 Scope and procedure for
subsidised loans
Restricted to environmental projects.
Financing proposal drawn up by the EIB, submitted
to the Commission and Art. 14 Committee
(composed of representatives of MS, chaired by the
MS chairing the Board of Governors of the Bank and
set up at the Bank); draft decision submitted by the
Commission to the Med Committee; FD taken by the
Commission and forwarded to the Bank which ‘may
grant the loan’.
No proposed amendment No sectoral restriction.
The EIB communicates the proposed project to the
Commission; the Commission verifies the
conformity of the project with the regulation and
takes the decision following the general procedure
set in Art. 9; if the decision is positive, the Bank may
grant the loan, subject to a positive opinion of the
Art. 14 Committee.
13 Scope and procedure for risk-
capital operations
The EIB submits its projects to Art. 14 Committee,
the Commission making its position known. On the
basis of that consultation, the EIB forwards the
project to the Commission which takes the financing
decision; the financing decision is forwarded to the
Bank for implementation.
No proposed amendment Necessary regional dimension.
The EIB communicates the proposed project to the
Commission in the form of a risk capital facility for
incorporation into a regional financing plan; if the
Commission (having verified the conformity of the
proposal with the MEDA regulation) decides in
favour of the incorporation, the Bank devises and
implements individual operations, subjected to the
positive opinion of the Art. 14 Committee (QMV)
and of the representative of the Commission therein.
15(1)
(2)
Annual report on the
progress achieved in the
implementation of MEDA
Submitted before 30 April.
Information on the measures financed and
assessment of the results obtained.
Submitted before 30 June Submitted no later than 30 June.
In addition, information on the results of the
monitoring activities.27
15(3) Evaluation of the projects Evaluation of the main projects. Made available to
the Council and the European Parliament; for
operations managed by the EIB, to the member
states.
Idem + evaluation of sectors of
intervention
Mid-term and ex-post evaluation of ‘the projects and
main sectors of intervention’. Made available to the
Med Committee and the European Parliament; for
operations managed by the EIB, to the Med
Committee.
15(4) Overall evaluation &
information
‘Overall assessment’ of the ‘cooperation policy’
every three years; information on the networks every
year; evaluation of decentralised cooperation
programmes every two years. All submitted to the
Med Committee.
No proposed amendment ‘Overall evaluation report of the assistance’ every
three years and to be presented to the Med
Committee ‘for discussion’. Other provisions
suppressed.
Annex Definition of support for
economic transition and the
establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area
Job creation and private sector development;
promotion of investment, industrial cooperation and
trade (including among Med partners themselves);
upgrading of economic infrastructure
No proposed amendment Idem + ‘opening-up of markets’
Annex Definition of operations in
support of structural
adjustment programmes
(SAP)
SAP designed to restore the major financial
balances, create a better economic environment and
improve the well-being of the population; alleviate
the negative effect of structural adjustment ‘for
underprivileged sections of the population’
SAP designed for the same
objectives + in view to the
creation of a free trade area
with the European Community
SAP designed for the same objectives + to
consolidate balances + in view to the creation of a
free trade area with the European Community +
alleviate the negative effect ‘for the most
underprivileged sections of the population’
Annex Definition of support for
socio-economic balance
Social services; fight against poverty; rural
development; fisheries; environment; economic
infrastructures; democracy and ‘respect for human
rights’; human resources; culture; illegal
immigration, drug trafficking and international crime
Idem + migration + trafficking
in human beings + judicial
cooperation in civil matters
Idem + ‘the promotion of wide and equitable sharing
of the fruits of growth’ + ‘defence’ of human rights +
migration + trafficking in human beings + ‘the
development of cooperation in areas relating to the
rule of law’.
Annex Definition of support for
regional cooperation
Regional and cross-border cooperation. Among other
types of action, networking of various actors from
civil societies. General objective: ‘The programmes
must concentrate on encouraging information
between networks and durable links between
network partners’.
No proposed amendment Subregional dimension explicitly added. Networking
of political science foundations added to the civil
society list. General objective: ‘The programmes
must concentrate on promoting the participation and
the emergence of civil society within the partner
countries, in particular by encouraging information
…’28
Table 4a. MEDA Programme - Financial Implementation 1995-99
Commitments Payments Disb. Rate Population 97 GNP/cap. 97 MEDA/cap.
  € mil. % Rank € mil. % Rank % Rank mil. % Rank € Rank € per
year
Rank
Algeria 164 4.77 8 30 4.05 7 18.29 6 29.32 13.65 3 1353 6 1.40 9
Morocco 656 19.10 2 127 17.16 3 19.36 5 27.31 12.72 4 1115 7 6.01 5
Tunisia 428 12.46 4 168 22.70 1 39.25 3 9.22 4.29 6 1840 4 11.61 2
South Med 1248 36.33   325 43.92   25.63   65.85 30.66   1322   6.34  
Egypt 686 19.97 1 157 21.22 2 22.89 4 60.35 28.10 2 1945 3 2.84 6
Jordan 254 7.39 6 108 14.59 4 42.52 2 4.44 2.07 7 1362 5 14.30 1
Lebanon 182 5.30 7 1 0.14 9 0.55 9 4.15 1.93 8 2919 1 10.96 3
Palestine 111 3.23 9 54 7.30 6 48.65 1 2.57 1.20 9 ? 10.80 4
Syria 99 2.88 10 0 0.00 10 0.00 10 14.89 6.93 5 929 8 1.66 7
East Med 1332 38.78   320 43.24   22.92   86.40 40.23   1853   8.11  
Turkey 375 10.92 5 15 2.03 8 4.00 8 62.51 29.11 1 2831 2 1.50 8
North Med 375 10.92   15 2.03   4.00   62.51 29.11   2831   1.50  
Regional 480 13.97 3 80 10.81 5 16.67 7           0.56  
Total or
Average
3435 100.0
0
740 100.0
0
21.22 214.76 100.0
0
1787 4.00
Note: The figures given by the European Commission for regional co-operation during this period include payments related to commitments made before 1996 (cf. 'Med
programmes'). If this amount (€150 million) is added to the MEDA payments, the disbursement rate for regional projects increases to 48%. The calculation of MEDA
funding per person per year is made on the basis of MEDA total commitments divided by 4 years (MEDA only started at the end of 1995). and assumes that each
country receives a share of the regional funds proportionate to its population.
Source: Compilation of tables from the European Commission (1998, 1999, 2000) and the DAC (2000).29
Table 4b. MEDA Programme - Financial Implementation 2000-01
  Commitments Payments Disb. Rate Population 2000 GNI/cap. 2000 MEDA/cap.
  € mil. % Rank € mil. % Rank % Rank mil. % Rank € Rank € per
year
Rank
Algeria 90.2 5.49 6 5.8 0.82 9 6.43 6 30.40 13.43 3 1738 6 0.74 9
Morocco 260.6 15.85 3 81.0 11.51 6 31.08 5 28.71 12.69 4 1298 8 2.27 5
Tunisia 165.7 10.08 4 84.9 12.07 5 51.24 3 9.56 4.22 6 2310 3 4.33 2
South Med 516.5 31.41   171.7 24.40   29.58   68.67 30.34   1634   2.45  
Egypt 12.7 0.77 9 126.9 18.04 1 999.21 4 63.98 28.27 2 1639 7 0.05 6
Jordan 35.0 2.13 8 95.3 13.54 3 272.29 2 4.89 2.16 7 1892 4 1.79 1
Lebanon 0.0 0.00 10 32.7 4.65 8 - 9 4.33 1.91 8 4411 1 0.00 3
Palestine 96.7 5.88 5 93.2 13.25 4 96.38 1 2.97 1.31 9 1815 5 8.14 4
Syria 46.0 2.80 7 2.2 0.31 10 4.78 10 16.19 7.15 5 1045 9 0.71 7
East Med 190.4 11.58   350.3 49.79   343.17   92.36 40.81   1684   2.14  
Turkey 457.4 27.82 2 101.6 14.44 2 22.21 8 65.29 28.85 1 3388 2 1.75 8
North Med 457.4 27.82   101.6 14.44   22.21   65.29 28.85   3388   1.75  
Regional 480.0 29.19 1 80.0 11.37 7 16.67 7           0.53  
Total 1644.3 100.00 703.6 100.0
0
166.70 226.32 100.00 2160 1.82
Note: The calculation of MEDA funding per person per year is made on the basis of MEDA total commitments divided by 2 years and assumes that each country receives a
share of the regional funds proportionate to its population. Turkey: The figure for commitments in 2000 includes €134.3 million for projects mentioned under previous
years (95-99) which were recommitted in 2000.
Source: Compilation of tables from the European Commission (2001, 2002) and the DAC (2002). Conversion rate: $1 = €1.1.30
Table 5a. MEDA Programme - Financial Implementation 1996-98 (Ecu millions)
  NIP
1 Commitments Com./NIP Payments
2 D. rate
3
  96-98 % 1996 1997 1998 Total % ratio 1996 1997 1998 Total % 96-98
Algeria 135.75 5.47 0.00 40.75 95.00 135.75 5.90 100 0.00 0.00 30.00 30.00 5.81 22.10
Morocco 454.48 18.32 0.00 235.57 219.00 454.57 19.77 100 0.00 30.00 40.71 70.71 13.69 15.56
Tunisia 356.90 14.39 120.00 138.25 19.00 277.25 12.06 78 40.00 60.00 8.30 108.30 20.97 39.06
South Med 947.13 38.18 120.00 414.57 333.00 867.57 37.73 92.57 40.00 90.00 79.01 209.01 40.47 25.57
Egypt 755.00 30.43 74.88 202.70 397.00 674.58 29.34 89 0.00 1.93 87.67 89.60 17.35 13.28
Jordan 125.24 5.05 100.00 10.00 8.00 118.00 5.13 94 60.00 45.00 0.00 105.00 20.33 88.98
Lebanon 96.00 3.87 10.00 86.11 0.00 96.11 4.18 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Palestine 66.20 2.67 20.00 41.20 5.00 66.20 2.88 - 20.00 25.00 7.08 52.08 10.09 78.67
Syria 70.00 2.82 12.50 42.00 0.00 54.50 2.37 78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
East Med 1112.44 44.84 217.38 382.01 410.00 1009.39 43.89 90.38 80.00 71.93 94.75 246.68 47.77 36.19
Turkey 235.40 9.49 33.14 70.24 132.00 235.38 10.24 - 0.00 3.21 8.83 12.04 2.33 5.12
North Med 235.40 9.49 33.14 70.24 132.00 235.38 10.24 - 0.00 3.21 8.83 12.04 2.33 5.12
Regional 186.00 7.50 32.48 108.75 46.00 187.23 8.14 101 6.20 17.51 24.97 48.68 9.43 26.00
Total or average 2480.97 100.00 403.00 975.57 921.00 2299.57 100.00 92.49 126.20 182.65 207.56 516.41 100.00 28.88
1 National Indicative Programme. The EC report on MEDA 1998 gives the 1996-98 NIP figures for all Med partners, but Egypt, Palestine and Turkey. For Egypt, it refers to the
1997-99 update NIP. For Palestine and Turkey, no indicative amounts are given. In order to estimate the percentage initially allocated to each Med partner, the table assumes
that Palestine and Turkey have totally absorbed available funds (indicative amounts = commitments).
2 The figures given by the European Commission for regional cooperation during this period include payments related to commitments made before 1996 (cf. 'Med
programmes'): ECU million 28,43 paid in 1996, 27,67 in 1997 and 22,51 in 1998. If this sum is added to the MEDA payments, the disbursement rate for regional projects
increases to 68%.
3 Disbursment rate.
Source: Compilation of tables from European Commission (1998), Exécution de la programmation budgétaire 1996-1997, Méditerranéenne, Amérique latine, Asie du Sud et du
Sud-Est; EC (1999), Exécution du programme MEDA de 1996 à 1998; EC (1999) 'Annual report of the MEDA programme 1998'.31
Table 5b. MEDA Programme - Financial Implementation 1999-01 (€ millions)
  NIP
1 Commitments Com./
NIP
Payments D. rate
2 NIP
  99-01 % 1999 2000 2001 Total % ratio 1999 2000 2001 Total % 90-01 02-04 %
Algeria   0.00 28.00 30.20 60.00 118.20 4.59 n.a. 0.20 0.40 5.40 6.00 0.61 5.08 150.00 7.16
Morocco   0.00 172.00 140.60 120.00 432.60 16.81 n.a. 53.70 39.90 41.10 134.70 13.78 31.14 426.00 20.35
Tunisia   0.00 131.00 75.70 90.00 296.70 11.53 n.a. 56.20 15.90 69.00 141.10 14.44 47.56 248.65 11.88
South Med 0.00 0.00 331.00 246.50 270.00 847.50 32.93 n.a. 110.10 56.20 115.50 281.80 28.84 33.25 824.65 39.39
Egypt   0.00 11.00 12.70 0.00 23.70 0.92 n.a. 67.10 64.40 62.50 194.00 19.85 818.57 351.00 16.76
Jordan   0.00 129.00 15.00 20.00 164.00 6.37 n.a. 1.60 84.50 10.80 96.90 9.92 59.09 142.00 6.78
Lebanon   0.00 86.00 0.00 0.00 86.00 3.34 n.a. 1.20 30.70 2.00 33.90 3.47 39.42 80.00 3.82
Palestine   0.00 42.00 96.70 0.00 138.70 5.39 n.a. 54.00 31.20 62.00 147.20 15.06 106.13 n.a. -
Syria   0.00 44.00 38.00 8.00 90.00 3.50 n.a. 0.00 0.30 1.90 2.20 0.23 2.44 93.00 4.44
East Med 0.00 0.00 312.00 162.40 28.00 502.40 19.52 n.a. 123.90 211.10 139.20 474.20 48.53 94.39 666.00 31.81
Turkey   0.00 140.00 310.40 147.00 597.40 23.21 n.a. 2.70 15.20 86.40 104.30 10.67 17.46 510.00 24.36
North Med 0.00 0.00 140.00 310.40 147.00 597.40 23.21 n.a. 2.70 15.20 86.40 104.30 10.67 17.46 510.00 24.36
Regional   0.00 154.00 159.80 312.40 626.20 24.33 n.a. 6.30 48.00 62.60 116.90 11.96 18.67 93.00 4.44
Total or
average
0.00 0.00 937.00 879.10 757.40 2573.50 100.0
0 n.a. 243.00 330.50 403.70 977.20 100.0
0 114.55 2093.6
5
100.0
0
1 National Indicative Programme. These figures were not available. For Palestine and Turkey, no indicative amounts are given. In order to estimate the percentage initially
allocated to each Med partner, the table assumes that Palestine and Turkey have totally absorbed available funds (indicative amounts = commitments).
2 Disbursement rate.
Source: Compilation of tables from European Commission (2002), Bilan de l'exécution budgétaire 2001 pour la Méditerranée et … (NIP & RIP 99 - 01)32
Table 6. Comparison EC Financial Assistance 1986-95 / MEDA 1995-01 (€ million)
1986-90 1991-95 1995-99 2000-01
  € % Rank € % Rank € % Rank € % Rank
Algeria 143.6 9.38 5 240.6 6.69 7 164.0 4.77 8 90.2 5.49 6
Morocco 185.7 12.13 3 286.6 7.97 6 656.0 19.10 2 260.6 15.85 3
Tunisia 341.7 22.33 2 383.1 10.65 4 428.0 12.46 4 165.7 10.08 4
South Med 671.0 43.85   910.3 25.31   1248.0 36.33   516.5 31.41  
Egypt 469.3 30.67 1 970.1 26.97 1 686.0 19.97 1 12.7 0.77 9
Jordan 99.1 6.48 6 427.8 11.89 3 254.0 7.39 6 35.0 2.13 8
Lebanon 49.2 3.22 7 86.8 2.41 9 182.0 5.30 7 0.0 0.00 10
182 11.89 4 532.7 14.81 2 111.0 3.23 9 96.7 5.88 5
Syria 22.5 1.47 9 73.8 2.05 10 99.0 2.88 10 46.0 2.80 7
East Med 822.1 53.72   2091.2 58.13   1332.0 38.78   190.4 11.58  
Turkey 32.8 2.14 8 232.7 6.47 8 375.0 10.92 5 457.4 27.82 2
North Med 32.8 2.14   232.7 6.47   375.0 10.92   457.4 27.82  
Regional 4.4 0.29 10 363 10.09 5 480.0 13.97 3 480.0 29.19 1
Total 1530.30 100.00 3597.2 100.00 3435.0 100.00 1644.3 100.00
Note: The ODI evaluation for 1986-90 and 1991-95 indicates that some funds could not be allocated to any category and were therefore not included in the figures reproduced
here. As for the 1995-99 figures, they do not include non MEDA budget lines, mainly benefiting Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (MEDA represents 73% of the total EC
assistance to the region), nor were the loans from the EIB.
Source: ODI 1996; COWI 1998; European Commission information notes (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).33
Table 7. Comparison MEDA / Net ODA for 2000-01 (M €)
  MEDA disbursements Net ODA receipts MEDA ODA/GNI
  2000 2001 Total % 2000 2001 Total % /ODA 2000
Algeria 0.40 5.40 5.80 0.93 178.66 205.64 384.30 4.21 1.51 0.32
Morocco 39.90 41.10 81.00 12.99 461.23 583.65 1044.88 11.44 7.75 1.29
Tunisia 15.90 69.00 84.90 13.61 245.03 426.77 671.79 7.35 12.64 1.20
South Med 56.20 115.50 171.70 27.53 884.92 1216.05 2100.97 23.00 8.17  
Egypt 64.40 62.50 126.90 20.35 1461.22 1418.32 2879.54 31.52 4.41 1.33
Jordan 84.50 10.80 95.30 15.28 607.70 487.61 1095.30 11.99 8.70 6.56
Lebanon 30.70 2.00 32.70 5.24 216.19 272.09 488.29 5.34 6.70 1.13
Palestine 31.20 62.00 93.20 14.95 701.05 977.55 1678.60 18.37 5.55 12.52
Syria 0.30 1.90 2.20 0.35 174.30 172.77 347.06 3.80 0.63 0.97
East Med 211.10 139.20 350.30 56.17 3160.45 3328.34 6488.79 71.03 5.40  
Turkey 15.20 86.40 101.60 16.29 357.41 188.56 545.98 5.98 18.61 0.16
North Med 15.20 86.40 101.60 16.29 357.41 188.56 545.98 5.98 18.61  
Total 282.50 341.10 623.60 100.00 4402.78 4732.95 9135.73 100.00 6.83  
Notes: Exchange rate applied for 2000: $1 = €1.1; for 2001: $1 = €1.13. MEDA disbursements in 2000 and 2001 for regional projects account for €80 million. ODA (Official
Development Aid) net receipts include EC assistance. ODA funds which could not be allocated on a country basis amount, for Northern Sahara, to $55 million, and for
the Middle East (where Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria are listed with Iran, Iraq and the Gulf States) to $207 million.
Source: Commission européenne (2002), Bilan de l'exécution budgétaire 2001 pour la Méditerranéenne, Europeaid Office de coopération.
Development Assistance Committee (2002), Table 25. ODA receipts and selected indicators for developing countries and territories, OECD, Paris.34
Figure 1. The three organisational dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
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Figure 2. Problem tree underpinning the EMP  
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